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The pricing practices of U.S. airlines, along with the overall 
situation of the U.S. airline industry, are widely discussed 
topics in today's business world. There seems to be a never 
ending controversy about rationality of prices imposed by 
airlines for their services to the travelling public and the 
objectives they want to accomplish.
This controversy reflects the public's great interest in air 
transportation and its importance to the country as a primary 
means of intercity travel. Besides, commercial aviation is a 
very important factor for the economy, employing over 500,000 
people and contributing over $ 300 billion yearly to the gross 
national product. U.S. airlines are also a major contributor 
to the nation's balance of payments. For example, American 
Airlines as the largest U.S. airline is number 18 among U.S. 
exporters (Crandall, 1992).
Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this paper is to provide for a greater 
understanding of price formulation in the U.S. airline 
industry. This paper will describe and analyze the factors 
influencing the making of pricing decisions by airlines in the 
domestic air travel market.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Justification of the Paper
Air transport is of far reaching importance. It is not only 
a means for the travelling public to get from one point to 
another, but also the major logistical component providing 
distribution service for other industries where surface 
transportation cannot provide the necessary speed and quality 
of service. As such, many parties have intense interest in 
the well-being of the airline industry.
Yet, in spite of its efficiency and reputation as being the 
best air transportation system in the world, the U.S. airline 
industry is in trouble. Over the time of its existence since 
1938 it has actually shown a net loss of $ 2.5 billion and 
during the last 25 years its average return on equity was only 
5%, compared to the 13.6% realized by the nation's top 500 
industrial companies. Recently, financial problems of U.S. 
airlines have become even more dramatic with a combined loss 
of over $ 6 billion in the 1990s (Crandall, 1992). Several 
airlines have gone bankrupt and as of 1992 there are still 
three airlines, America West, TWA, and Continental, operating 
under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
The obvious reason for the unprofitability of the U.S. airline 
industry is that airlines do not get adequate compensation for 
the services they provide to cover their expenses and render
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a reasonable return to their stockholders (Crandall, 1992). 
Yet, this situation proves to be only a symptom with the real 
problems being rooted in the question as to of why airlines 
are not getting appropriate compensation in the market. This 
paper will examine airline pricing strategies, thus providing 
valuable information about the circumstances of their 
formation, insights into the airline economics, and a 
comprehensive understanding of the airline business
Definition of Terms
In this section, a number of important terms are defined in 
order to familiarize the reader and to facilitate their 
understanding throughout the paper. These terms are among the 
standard terminology used in the air carrier industry.
Average Load Factor 
The average load factor is the percentile share of occupied 
seats from total available seats during a particular time 
period. Usually, average load factors are calculated for the 
time during one business year, thus enabling airlines to use 
average load factors in order to determine the influence of 
changes in passenger numbers on the operational and financial 
success of airlines.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Seat-Mile
A seat-mile is a capacity figure, and expresses one available 
seat transported the distance of one mile. For example, if an 
airline has a scheduled flight by an airplane having 100 
seats, on a route having a distance of 1000 miles, the total 
capacity available would be 100,000 seat-miles. Seat-mile 
figures are used in operational planning, as well as financial 
planning in order to determine cost of production of the 
services they provide.
Slot
A slot is the right for a scheduled landing and departure on 
a specific airport, and at a specific time. Originally, the 
slot system was introduced in 1969 as a temporary system for 
four congested airports. New York-JFK, New York-LaGuardia, 
Chicago-O'Hare, and Washington-National. Yet, it still is in 
place today.
Research Methods
Since the character of this paper is non-experimental, 
secondary data sources will be used. The largest part of the 
data will come from current newspaper and magazine articles 
due to the rapidly changing subject of airline pricing. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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remaining data will be obtained from the academic literature 
on airline pricing and related topics.
Contributions of the Paper
In describing and analyzing the pricing strategies used by 
airlines, this paper should contribute significantly to an 
understanding of the underlying forces shaping airline pricing 
policies, and with pricing being one of the principal elements 
of airline business policies, to a more profound understanding 
of the airline business overall.
This paper will be of value especially to airline executives, 
but also to legislators involved in regulatory control of 
airlines and commercial aviation, and leaders of industries 
that rely on airlines as a major component of their logistics 
and transportation system. Finally, it will contribute to a 
more profound knowledge of airlines by individuals who are not 
professionally interested in airlines, mainly the travelling 
public and indirect consumers of airline services.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Background
Today's price wars are only a visible symptom of deeper 
problems witbin the airline industry. They represent the 
painful change from a regulated market which existed for 40 
years, from 1938 to 1978, to a currently deregulated market. 
Current airline policies and strategies, in particular pricing 
strategy originated as a direct response to structures during 
regulation. The old policies and strategies of a regulated 
market were regarded as suboptimal by the airlines after 
deregulation and as such were quickly replaced by a new 
approach of doing business and operating an airline. In order 
to understand current airline pricing strategies, the 
historical background and pricing practices during regulation 
need to be examined.
The impetus for civil air transportation in the U.S. started 
in 1938 with the Civil Aeronautics Act. In contrast to other 
emerging industries, the airline industry was promoted as an 
infant industry (Douglas, Miller, 1974). It was put under 
strict governmental control and regulation from the beginning 
of its existence, with the primary goal being to make air 
travel a major means of intercity commercial transportation 
(Douglas, Miller, 1974). This goal was reached very soon as 
passenger numbers soared.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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By 1940, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was created, as 
part of the Department of Commerce, and put in charge of 
commercial aviation. Its responsibilities, among others, were 
(a) granting the right to air carriers to service specific 
routes, thus regulating entry into the airline market, (b) the 
regulation of rates carriers were allowed to charge, and (c) 
setting and enforcing standards for air safety (Douglas, 
Miller, 1974).
Time of Regulation 1938-1978
A major characteristic of the regulated airline market was the 
tight control the CAB held over fares and entry to the market. 
The intention was to satisfy national needs for growth and 
development by establishing an airline market structure where 
excessive and destructive competition would not jeopardize the 
objectives of what was considered a "public utility" (Dempsey, 
1989). In order to extend service by adding new routes, 
airlines had to demonstrate that they were required by public 
convenience and necessity (Morrison, Winston, 1986).
Section (404,a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act required carriers 
"to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable 
individual and joint rates, fares, and charges". The CAB had 
the delicate responsibility to "determine and prescribe the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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lawful rate, fare, and charge" in cases where it saw "unjust 
or unreasonable" rates, fares, and charges (Section 1002,d). 
An appropriate fare, rate, and charge was described under 
section (1002,e,5) of the Federal Aviation Act, which states 
that the Board must take into consideration "the need of each 
carrier for revenue sufficient to enable such a carrier, under 
honest, economic, and efficient management, to provide 
adequate and efficient air carrier service" when setting 
fares. In order to fulfil its task, the CAB employed a 
strategy of determining airline costs by using several 
approaches, such as cost formulas developed by its Bureau of 
Economics, then adding a "reasonable" profit, and then 
designating this amount as the fare airlines were allowed to 
charge (Douglas, Miller, 1974).
During the development of the U.S. airline industry it proved 
to be quite difficult to follow changing cost structures in a 
dynamic market such as air transportation. Innovations like 
the introduction of jet aircraft in the 1960s with their much 
lower operating costs than propeller-powered aircraft 
challenged the CAB in its ability to keep up with the changes. 
To the frustration of airlines the CAB did not succeed in 
reflecting these cost changes by lowering fares quickly enough 
to the extent costs had decreased. Another problem proved to 
be the CAB’s slow reaction to price changes caused by 
fluctuations in market demand, resulting in inadequate prices
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for different levels of market demand (Douglas, Miller, 1974). 
All this led to two large, in-depth investigations, 1956-1960 
and 1970, which turned out to be a great disappointment for 
the airlines. Despite the enormous resources devoted to this 
endeavor, these studies provided no clear direction or 
solution to pricing problems in the air carrier industry 
(Douglas, Miller, 1974).
Although airlines were strictly limited in their freedom to 
fly additional routes and charge fares which they thought 
would be appropriate, flight frequency was not explicitly 
regulated once an airline was awarded the right to serve a 
certain route. The logic behind the practice was to eliminate 
all factors of competition but service. Since flight 
frequency was the major component of an airline’s service, and 
determined the quality of its service to a large extent, 
competition was possible and desired by the CAB in this area. 
Destructive price competition would be kept out of the market, 
while still maintaining some kind of competition in order to 
serve the public interest in the desirable way (Dempsey, 1989; 
Morrison, Winston, 1986).
Consequently, airlines provided an excessive number of 
flights, leading to low passenger load factors, higher costs 
than necessary, and as a result higher fares. Several studies 
in the early 1970s concluded that travelers lost $ 1 billion
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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per year due to the misallocation of resources for providing 
excessive flight frequency (Douglas, Miller, 1974; Morrison, 
Winston, 1986)
Another important issue during regulation was that of cross­
subsidization, the idea being to use profits from some markets 
to offset losses in others. The CAB actively promoted such 
behavior, especially to sustain adequate service on short-haul 
routes where cross-elasticity of demand in relation to other 
forms of transportation was high. This was funded by profits 
from long-haul routes where travelers usually did not have 
much choice and were not as sensitive to price changes 
(McAvoy, Snow, 1977).
Change to a Deregulated Market
As commercial aviation grew larger in the postwar era, it 
became more and more apparent that its regulated structure was 
inherently inefficient. The turning point came in 1976, with 
the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as president, and the 
subsequent appointment of Alfred Kahn, a Cornell economics 
professor as Chairman of the CAB.
Being a strong opponent of a regulated airline market, Kahn 
criticized the industry's enormous resource misallocation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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offering excessive capacities^ leading to extraordinary 
inefficiency. As a result, he saw the regulated system as 
causing higher fares than would occur in a market with more 
freedom for airlines, and criticized the market structure for 
not being suitable to reflect customer needs since it denied 
travelers the range of price/service options they wanted 
(Dempsey, 1989).
TABLE 1: DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN INTRA-STATE AND INTER-STATE
FARES IN CALIFORNIA, 1972
Percent
Intra-State Inter-State Inter-State
Fares Fares aboveLength of Haul per mile per mile Intra-State
Very short Haul 16.923 c 23.585 c 39.4
(65 miles)
Short Haul
(109 miles) 9.363 c 16.858 c 80.0Short-medium Haul
(338-373 miles) 5.021 c 9.685 c 92.9
Source: Simat, Hellisen, and Eichner, Inc., An Analysis of the
Intrastate Air Carrier Reuulatorv Forum, vol. 2, table 10, p.47
During the 1970s, the issue of regulation caught the public 
attention when three carriers operating in California and 
Texas namely PSA, Air California and Southwest as intra-state 
carriers, thus being exempt from federal regulation by the 
CAB, provided a high level of service while keeping fares well
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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below those charged by the significantly larger inter-state 
carriers. Surprisingly, in addition these carriers even 
earned profits, while regulated carriers remained unprofitable 
(NcAvoy, Snow, 1977).
This obvious proof of the superiority of a nonregulated 
market, as well as experiences by the CAB itself, led to a 
legislative initiative in Congress that ended with the Airline 
Deregulation Act in 1978- Regulations in some areas of air 
service were still upheld, such as the prohibition against 
terminating "essential air service" to "eligible" points 
unless the CAB secured a replacement carrier, even if it meant 
offering a subsidy to provide a reasonable profit, in order to 
provide small communities with air service. In spite of some 
restrictions imposed to ease the transition to a nonregulated 
market, the cornerstone of the Airline Deregulation Act was 
the creation of a free market of air transportation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Cost Structure of Airlines
In the airline industry, as in most other industries, a major 
determinant of prices for products or services is costs which 
are incurred providing the particular product or service. 
Consequently, it is important to be familiar with the 
structure and character of costs of U.S. airlines in order to 
understand the pricing system for services provided.
As an example of the cost structure of U.S. airlines during 
one fiscal year, the percentile distribution of the costs of 
the three major U.S. airlines (American Airlines, United 
Airlines and Delta Air Lines) is shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2: OPERATING COSTS OF THE THREE BIGGEST U.S. AIRLINES
DURING FISCAL YEAR 1991 (IN $ MILLION)
AIRLINE AMR UAL Delta Total Percent
Wages, salaries and benefits 4,340 4,296 3,752 12,388 35.74Aircraft Fuel 1,821 1, 674 1,599 5,094 14.70
Commissions 1, 148 2,046 923 4, 117 11.88Depr. and Amort. 883 604 521 2,008 5.79Maintenance 673 363 326 1, 362 3.93Rentals and fees 1,238 1,085 837 3,160 9.12Food and beverages 624 293 409 1, 326 3.83Other 2,155 1,797 1,252 5,204 15.01
Source: AMR Corp., UAL Corp. , and Delta Inc . , Annual Reports.1991
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The largest single operating expense of U.S. airlines is wages 
and salaries, representing 35.7% of total operating costs of 
the three biggest airlines in the U.S. This reflects the fact 
that air transportation is a service industry, with labor as 
its primary factor of production. For example, the largest 
U.S. airline alone, AMR, employed 116,254 people in 1991, of 
whom 11,492 were highly paid pilots- The second largest 
single operating expense at American was aircraft fuel, which 
accounted for 14.7% of total operating expenditures at AMR 
(AMR Corp., Annual Report 1991).
A unique characteristic of the airline business is that of 
very high investments being required for aircraft, terminal 
facilities, computer reservation systems, and other capital 
accoutrements in order to provide air transportation service. 
For instance, in 1991 AMR alone had $ 11 billion worth of 
equipment and property, representing 69% of its total assets 
(AMR Corp. Annual Report 1991).
As a direct consequence of extremely high capital investments, 
airlines face high capital expenditures in the form of 
depreciation, amortization and interest expenses. Since 
capital expenditures can reach up to 30% of total revenues, as 
in the case of AMR from 1986 to 1991 (Crandall, 1992), they 
represent a significant factor of uncertainty in the airline's 
quest for profitability.
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During recent years, airlines have experienced an enormous 
escalation in costs* The reason behind this is two-fold. 
First, it reflects the airline's expansion of operations with 
an ever increasing number of flights and services (Crandall, 
1992), which is primarily due to changes in the competitive 
environment. In order to increase their overall service and 
thus competitiveness, every airline of the 'Big Three' (AMR, 
UAL, and Delta Air Lines) is increasing the number of flights. 
Other airlines, as well as the 'Big Three ' airlines among 
themselves, then have to follow in order to stay competitive.
The second reason for escalating costs is the inflation of 
prices for airplanes. Nowadays, airplanes are much more 
sophisticated and thus expensive, and have more and better 
flight equipment (e.g., more advanced avionics). 
Consequently, airplanes such as the Boeing 767 cost around $ 
75 million, and intercontinental airplanes well over $ 100 
million.
A problem airlines constantly face is that of changing costs 
caused by price fluctuations for aircraft fuel. Since 
aircraft fuel represents around 15% of total operating costs, 
even a small change in the price of aircraft fuel causes a 
significant increase in operating cost, forcing profits to 
decline. For instance, from July 1989 to January 1990, the 
price per gallon aircraft fuel jumped from 54.3 cents to 79.6
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cents per gallon, a 46% increase in just seven months (Delta 
Air Lines Inc., Annual Report 1991). How significant price 
increases for aircraft fuel can be, is shown by the example of 
Delta Air Lines during fiscal year 1991: the increase in the 
average cost of aircraft fuel by 18% from 1990 to 1991 
required Delta Air Lines to pay an additional $ 187 million 
for fuel (Delta Air Lines Inc., Annual Report 1991).
Fixed Costs vs. Variable Costs
Airlines have a unique structure of costs which is comparable 
to only a few other industries, of which most are also 
providing some kind of transportation service. Its major 
characteristic is that of a high percentage of fixed costs 
relative to total costs, and relatively low variable costs. 
Of the eight groups of operating costs (Appendix 1), only two 
are truly variable, 'Commissions' and 'Food', with 'variable' 
meaning that they increase if an individual passenger decides 
to buy the service of air transportation from an airline.
During fiscal year 1991, only 15.7% of operating costs of the 
' Big Three ' were variable, with the rest of 84.3% of operating 
costs being fixed (Table 1). This tendency toward a cost 
structure of high fixed costs and low variable costs is even 
more apparent when taking into account capital spending in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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form of interest payments, in addition to operating costs, 
which increase the share of fixed costs even further.
General Airline Economics
Airline economics are of a distinctive nature, reflecting the
unique characteristics of the airline business- They are
driven by three primary imperatives.
First, in the short-term, airlines tend to focus on covering 
variable costs only. This is because airlines have to make 
huge capital investments, thus incurring high fixed costs, 
while incremental costs remain relatively small. Hence, 
airlines have the weighty temptation to fill any empty seats 
since most of the costs for providing these seats are already 
incurred, and even very low discount fares cover variable 
costs (Crandall, 1992).
Second, airlines have very little room to reduce their costs 
during times of reduced demand, and thus reduced revenues 
result. This is because cost reduction would only be possible 
by reducing flight frequency, and since flight frequency is 
the main determinant of service quality, it would be
disastrous in a market where competitors are not doing the
same (Crandall, 1992).
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Third, it is essential for airlines to have a consistent and 
predictable business environment as far as it is legislated 
and regulated by the government (Crandall, 1992). This is 
because airlines have to plan so far ahead. Deciding to buy 
a particular airplane means a long-term commitment, with each 
airplane being in the carrier's fleet for twenty to thirty 
years, that is if the airplane is not sold before the end of 
its useful life. The implication for planning of supporting 
equipment, such as ground facilities and computer systems, is 
that such planning has to be aligned with the planning of 
flight equipment, thus causing an overall planning horizon of 
twenty to thirty years for airlines.
Government and regulatory bodies have to take great care and 
responsibility in creating rules for airlines. Only a stable 
and predictable set of ground rules would enable airlines to 
plan for the future (Crandall, 1992). Changes in rules, such 
as those for pollution and noise control, can mean that 
investments in flight equipment can lose great portions of 
their worth, in case operating expenses increase due to 
restrictions, additional fees, etc.
Another important issue is that the government restricts 
access to the four major airports Chicago-O'Hare, New York- 
LaGuardia, New York-JFK, and Washington-National through the
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implementation of the slot-system. In some cases slots at 
these airports are taken away from one airline and given to 
another. Here, too, inefficiencies arise since airlines 
cannot accomplish their previously set operations plans, 
especially when flight equipment cannot be utilized in the way 
and to the extent as planned.
Due to the fact that airline costs are to a large extent fixed 
costs, the break-even point in the airline industry is reached 
relatively late, and, compared to other industries, only after 
rather high revenues. But, when reached, profits pick up 
extremely fast since fixed costs are already covered by gross 
margins of previous sales, and additional sales contribute 
with their high gross margins to profits.
Consequently, the airline business is very volatile and 
unpredictable- Airlines have great difficulty in planning 
both fleet expansions and their supply of air transportation 
capacity since expected demand can change quickly. Similar 
problems arise in the financial field of airline planning, 
where the same unpredictability causes uncertainty regarding 
the extent of dividend payouts, additional stock issuance, 
etc. One airline. Delta Air Lines, has implemented a dividend 
policy providing consistent dividend payouts for common shares 
in spite of changing levels of profitability. Especially 
during 1991, the worst year in Delta's history, it proved to
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be very difficult to uphold this policy, taking into account 
Delta's $ 343 million net loss (Delta Air Lines, Annual
Report, 1991).
To illustrate this unique example of business economics, the 
situation of Delta Air Lines during fiscal years 1990 and 1991 
serves well. In 1990, the average load factor to break even 
was 58.0%, and by surpassing it with an average load factor of 
61.2%, Delta earned $ 303 million in net income. On the other 
hand, during 1991, with an average break-even load factor of 
62.6%, and by reaching only an average load factor of 59.5%, 
Delta suffered a net loss of $ 324 million (Delta Air Lines 
Inc., Annual Report 1991).
Airline Economics of Operations
From the days of regulation up until now airlines have changed 
the way they provide air transportation to passengers. While 
previous connections between city-pairs were mostly direct, 
airlines started to change to a hub-and-spoke route structure 
during the late regulatory period in the late 1970s, which has 
been accelerated by post-regulatory developments. Hub-and- 
spoke systems work by feeding passengers from their 
origination airport on spoke routes into a major airport
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(hub), where they have to change to another flight that takes 
them to their destination airport-
Behind the system of hub-and-spoke is a clear operational 
economic rationale of costs savings. It is referred to as 
economies of scope, and arises when additional costs due to 
rerouting passengers are more than offset by cost savings due 
to a more efficient usage of labor, equipment, and fuel which 
are associated with large wide-body aircraft (Morrison, 
Winston, 1986).
Another important advantage of the hub-and-spoke system, 
compared to direct service, is its role as a marketing tool. 
Since most city pairs have a volume of traffic too low to 
justify a direct connection, airlines would not offer any 
service to most destinations under a direct service system. 
In contrast, a hub-and-spoke system is well able to 
accommodate all passengers out of a particular city wishing to 
fly to one of the destinations served from the airline's hub 
airport (Morrison, Winston, 1986).
The significance of this advantage for an airline in the 
market is shown in a study by Carlton, Landes, and Posner 
(1980). They found that passengers much prefer single-carrier 
service over having to change airlines in midjourney. 
Changing airlines in most cases would be the only option of
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air travel for passengers travelling between a city-pair not 
served directly by a particular airline which shows how much 
of an advantage a hub-and-spoke system really Is.
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P u r p o s e  o f  t h e  A i r  T r a v e l  M a r k e t
The purpose of the air travel market is to facilitate the 
provision of air travel services for the public. Since the 
provision of air travel services also would be possible in 
other ways, such as through quotas, a market is only one of 
several viable ways. However, market mechanisms have been 
chosen by the legislature since it was believed that this 
would serve the public's interest best, as with many other 
goods and services, too.
Markets are not equally competitive. Some have a higher 
degree of competitiveness, others a lower. But, it is always 
the market that determines how well competitive forces can be 
utilized in sustaining a well-functioning market, made up of 
factors such as desirable pricing, quality, and the like.
A market is able to serve the public only if the interplay 
between supply and demand is facilitated (Douglas, Miller, 
1974). As Robert Crandall (1992), CEO and Chairman of AMR, 
puts it, " . . .the only way to be sure we end up with an airline 
system that offers the public modern airplanes, the highest 
possible safety standards, competitive pricing, and a 
marketplace in which consumers can pick and choose among many 
alternatives -- is to trust in the power of the market ...".
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C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  A i r  T r a v e l  M a r k e t
The market for which air travel is produced, and at which air 
travel is traded, is the market for intercity transportation 
in the U.S. (Cherington, 1958). It is divided into several 
sub-markets, such as automotive, bus, rail, and air 
transportation all of which have the common goal of providing 
intercity transportation. However, the difference among these 
sub-markets is the means by which transportation between city 
pairs is provided.
Intercity transportation cannot be offered in one sub-market, 
such as the air intercity transportation sub-market, without 
the interference from other sub-markets. Besides suppliers of 
intercity transportation on the same sub-market, offering a 
service of similar quality, there are also suppliers in other 
sub-markets, who supply the same service, but in a different 
way and with a different quality. Hence, airlines have to 
take in account not only market forces influencing the air 
travel sub-market, but also need to look at other sub-markets 
of intercity transportation, such as bus-lines and railroads 
where similar services are offered.
An important characteristic of the airline industry is that it 
provides a good which is "intermediate" (Douglas, Miller, 
1974). This means that its purpose is not to give benefit
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from consumption of the service itself, but to gain access to 
something else giving benefit to the traveller, such as making 
a business call, or visiting a friend.
As a consequence, market characteristics are highly influenced 
by the fact that consumers regard one airline's seats as ready 
substitutes for another airline's seats (Crandall, 1992), in 
a commodity-like fashion. Since the result of usage of an 
airlines's service namely, arriving at a destination, is what 
counts, the quality of the process of receiving the service is 
of only minor importance-
Besides the commodity-like character of air travel, another 
very important characteristic of the air travel market is 
customer access to nearly perfect market information. With 
the emergence of computerized reservation systems (CRS's), 
travel agents can provide customers with information about 
every airline's price for a desired route, as well as 
available seating (Crandall, 1992). Especially for
competitive strategies of individual airlines this combination 
of a commodity-like service and perfect market information has 
extremely important implications, and will be explored further 
in Chapter V.
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T h e  Demand f o r  A i r  T r a v e l
Before there is demand for air travel by an individual, there 
is always a rather complex travel decision. That decision can 
be separated into three components: (a) whether to travel at 
all, (b) by what mode: air, auto, bus, or other, and (c) at 
what time (Douglas, Miller, 1974).
Once the travel decision has been made, it can be assumed that 
the traveller wants to minimize the cost and inconvenience 
associated with taking the trip. Consequently, besides the 
monetary cost represented by the paid price, the traveller 
also incurs a "cost of inconvenience" from (a) trip time, and 
(b) schedule inconvenience (Douglas, Miller, 1974). Trip time 
is the time enroute, while schedule inconvenience arises from 
losses in time due to an airline schedule incompatible with 
the traveller's schedule. As a result, in calculating total 
cost of travel, the traveller assigns a quantitative value to 
time, then calculates and adds costs of inconvenience relative 
to the monetary amount paid.
The character of the traveller’s total costs is made up from 
the three components (a) monetary costs, (b) cost of trip 
time, and (c) cost of schedule inconvenience and has 
significant implications for the demand of air travel. First, 
in competing with other modes of travel, air travel has a
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great advantage of time, while having a disadvantage in fares. 
As a result, the value of time for the traveller becomes the 
determinant of which mode of travel to choose (Douglas, 
Miller, 1974). Concerning substitution elasticity, demand for 
air travel increases as value of time increases, with the 
current trend being to the advantage of air travel since value 
of time is increasing.
Second, the substitutional advantage of air travel to ground 
travel increases with distance. The reason is that the time 
advantage of air travel, expressed monetarily, grows faster 
with distance than the cost advantage of ground travel 
(Douglas, Miller, 1974).
Third, demand for air travel is highly income elastic. This 
is not only due to the inherent increase in air travel with 
higher income, but also to a change in time value (Douglas, 
Miller, 1974). With a higher income, the value an individual 
assigns for his or her time increases. As a result, the cost 
for trip time and schedule inconvenience increases 
significantly, making the total cost of ground travel much 
higher than the cost of air travel.
Fourth, demand for air travel also is shown to be very price 
elastic. This can be explained with a reduction of total 
costs for air travel, putting the total cost of air travel
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under the total costs for other competing modes of travel. 
Especially for air travel in coach class, high price 
elasticities can be observed while demand for first class air 
travel is rather inelastic, and to some extent even totally 
inelastic. The reason is the different values of time 
travellers assign in different classes. Coach travellers 
place a relatively low value on time. Consequently, their 
time cost is rather low, while the ticket price represents a 
high percentage of the total cost. With a ticket price 
reduction their total travel cost decreases sharply, 
motivating an elastic reaction.
In contrast, first class passengers place a high value on 
time. Their total cost is mostly caused by loss of time, 
while the ticket price represents an only relatively small 
part of the total cost. Hence, a ticket price reduction does 
not reduce their total cost sufficiently to cause an elastic 
reaction of increased demand.
Another issue besides the level of demand is the quality of 
demand, meaning the service level, features, etc., which are 
demanded by the travelling public. The shape of today's 
product "air travel" is of a uniform character, with nearly 
every airline being a "traditional airline," and offering the 
same product. With some few exceptions, passengers do not 
have the choice, for example, to have no meals during flight.
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no advanced boarding passes, and thus lower quality of 
service, while paying a lower price. Here, there is still 
unsatisfied demand.
The Supply of Air Travel
Currently, one of the most widely discussed topics among 
stakeholders of airlines, as well as in the airline industry 
itself, is the trend toward concentration of air travel 
suppliers. Since deregulation in 1978, many large scale 
acquisitions and mergers have taken place, representing deals 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and involving some of 
America's most prestigious carriers (Table 3). This has lead 
to criticisms that an overly concentrated air travel market 
may not be in the best interest of the public, and could 
jeopardize the provision of reliable and affordable air 
transportation.
Alfred Kahn, last chairman of the CAB, and an outspoken 
advocate of deregulation, saw fears of chaos from an 
excessively concentrated market as unrealistic (Dempsey, 
1989). He argued that "... almost all of this industry's 
markets can support only a single carrier or a few: their
natural structure, therefore, is monopolistic or 
oligopolistic..." (Dempsey, 1989).






MAJOR AIR CARRIER MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, PURCHASES
CONSOLIDATIONS SINCE PROMULGATION OF THE AIR 
DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
ACQUIREE(S)/PRICE MARKET SHARE IN 1989
American Air Cal 16.6
United Pan Am, Pacific Routes
($ 750 million)
16.2
Texas Air Continental ($ 100 million) Eastern ($ 675 million)
New York Air
People Express ($ 298 million) 
Rocky Mountain 15.9
Delta Western ($ 860 million) 13.3
Northwest Republic ($ 884 million) 9.6
TWA Ozark ($ 224 million) 7.2
US Air PSA
Piedmont ($ 1.2 billion) 7.2
Pan Am National ($ 400 million) 
Ransome 5.9
Source: Dempsey, 1989
Kahn argues that few economies of scale exist; hence potential 
entry with a low entry barrier would keep monopolists from 
extracting monopoly profits (Dempsey, 1989). Crandall sees 
the chance of the 'Big Three' (American, United, and Delta) 
becoming an oligopoly as being "very small," and shows 
confidence that such a problem could be "quickly fixed," 
hinting at the responsibility of the government to facilitate 
a competitive air travel market (Crandall, 1992).
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Without doubt, the U.S. airline industry currently is highly 
concentrated, which, in combination with the inherent high 
price and income elasticities, brings the airline industry 
into a dilemma of two possible ways to achieve its desired 
high profits. One possibility is to act cooperatively and in 
a coordinated way in order to realize profits close to the 
theoretical monopoly maximum. The second option is to act on 
an individual basis, lowering prices relative to competition, 
and thus, by taking advantage of the high price sensitivity, 
increase market share and profits (Caves, 1962). Clearly, the 
individualistic approach is the one that is currently employed 
in the U.S. air travel market, and the one which will be 
further explored in the following chapter.
As a result of changes in demand, suppliers of air travel 
service are currently thinking about changes in the product- 
price mix of their supply. They see the inevitable need for 
more options for customers, especially after the dramatic rise 
of low-cost, no-frills Southwest Airlines (Crandall, 1992). 
But, these changes may prove to be difficult : if
"traditional" airlines try to offer similar low-quality air 
transportation besides their "regular" high-quality and high- 
service flights, they may be in danger of tarnishing their 
image. On the other hand, if they do not offer a better 
price-product mix, their market share may decline, to the 
advantage of airlines providing the desired price-product mix.
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Whole market segments in fact have become dominated by low- 
quality carriers, such as Southwest Airlines in California, 
where American is even considering a pullout (Business Week, 
July 6, 1992).
Air Travel Market Dynamics
As mentioned earlier, a market-economy of air transportation 
has been designated by legislation as serving in the public's 
best interest. But, in order to work well, the powers shaping 
the market, which are demand on the one side, and supply on 
the other side, have to be balanced. Here again, government 
has to play an important role by setting rules that promote 
that balance.
Deviations from balance in the market always mean a 
disadvantage to some of the stakeholders of the airline 
industry. If there is more demand than supply, travellers 
lose since prices will be much higher than the ideal. On the 
other hand, if supply is inappropriately high, investors and 
creditors of the airline industry lose. But, what both cases 
have in common, is the immense influence of discrepancies 
between demand and supply on pricing.
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In today's air travel market, the second alternative, that of 
an extensively high supply, represents current reality. As a 
result, competition among airlines for available passengers is 
high, manifesting itself in highly visible cut-throat pricing. 
Obviously, the pricing situation does not serve the interest 
of airlines and their financial stakeholders who are calling 
for corrective action. Crandall, for example, calls for 
allowing the market to establish a "reasonable balance between 
supply and demand" to make it competitive and profitable 
(Crandall, 1992). This, of course, contradicts another 
important objective, namely that of creating a competitive 
market. With the belief that competition is positively 
correlated with the number of airlines, it is difficult to 
take that over-supply from the market.
A further influential factor on the interplay and balance of 
supply and demand is the fluctuation of demand due to external 
factors. Events such as the Gulf War, when travellers tried 
to stay away from air travel because of fear from terrorism, 
quickly lowered demand for air travel in a dramatic manner. 
Consequently, with the very dynamic character of the air 
travel market, the fragile relationship between supply and 
demand was distorted, largely to the disadvantage of providers 
of air travel.
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The Employment of Competitive Forces in the Market
From the beginning in 1978, the current air travel market has 
been based on competition. It was believed, that market 
forces would create competition in a desired way, where 
passengers would be provided with a good product at a low 
price. In a competitive market, the government expected, the 
product of air travel would be provided by the most efficient 
producers, with the industry enjoying an efficient allocation 
of resources. In a competitive marketplace, contrary to 
experiences during the time of regulation 1938-1978, input- 
waste, excess-capacity, or other misailocations are not 
expected to occur (Dempsey, 1989).
However, besides the potential positive effects of a 
competitive market, the government was also very well aware of 
the chances of possible negative effects of competition. In 
a study of federal regulation by the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs in 1978, "destructive competition", 
meaning a scenario of periodical shortages, poor service, slow 
technical advancement, and inadequate investment, was 
identified as possible but "...unlikely in the cases of 
airlines...".
This shows the unpredictability of the air travel market which 
was driven by market forces after deregulation. Not only the
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conditions of the regulatory period did not apply, but also 
the deregulatory experiences of related industries, including 
motor carriers and railroads were not directly relevant to the 
air carrier industry. The fact that no other major air travel 
market in the world is working on competitive principles 
demonstrates how risky such an endeavor is.
The current state of knowledge regarding the viability of 
employing competitive forces in the air travel market in order 
to reach a high level of benefit for both, travellers and 
airlines, is still limited. It remains a large-scale economic 
experiment. However, there are already concrete observations 
which can be made, and which give information regarding the 
extent to which competition is affecting and shaping the air 
travel market, thus giving clues about implications for 
pricing.
Means of Competition
When the air travel market was deregulated in 1978, the 
primary means of competition was service, and since airlines 
were already allowed to alternate fares to a certain extent, 
the price. This has changed profoundly. Today, the most 
important and most effective means of competition is price. 
This is due to a number of reasons.
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First, and most important, the unique economic considerations 
of the airline business cause airlines compete primarily in 
pricing. As discussed in chapter III, costs are largely 
fixed, with incremental costs representing only a minimal 
percentage. Consequently, every fare which is above the 
incremental cost level, is contributing to the coverage of 
fixed costs. It is better for an airline to have a passenger 
on board who covers at least some part of fixed costs than not 
having him or her at all. Since incremental costs for one 
passenger on a transcontinental flight run as low as $30 for 
meal and increased fuel burn due to increased weight of the 
airplane, airlines have a great deal of room for decreasing 
fares, while still getting a contribution to fixed costs. 
Consequently, the use of pricing as a competitive instrument 
is widely practiced.
Second, and as mentioned before, air travellers are very price 
elastic. This is not only in relation to the travel decision 
itself, that is to travel or not to travel, but also in 
relation to the choice of an individual airline by the 
consumer. Even a small difference in fares is likely to be a 
major, if not dominant, factor in the final selection of an 
airline by a passenger.
Third, customers regard air travel as an intermediate good. 
The implication is that travellers do not give as much
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consideration to the quality aspect of air travel, as they 
would for non-intermediate goods. What counts mostly, is the 
result of consumption, not the mode and benefits during the 
consumption itself. Passengers simply appreciate price cuts 
more than augmentations to extravagant food, and individual TV 
screens. Accordingly, airlines do what attracts passengers, 
and that is offering good prices relative to competitors.
Fourth, and related to the reason of air travel being an 
intermediate good, is the fact that consumers have very little 
brand loyalty. As a result, obstacles for an airline to 
attract previous customers of another airline are few. This 
is because air travel service is considered a commodity. 
Airlines are unable to give their product a unique 
identification in order to differentiate it from the products 
of other airlines. The most important incentive until now for 
increasing brand loyalty has been the introduction of frequent 
flyer programs, an option which was first introduced in 1981 
by American Airlines and quickly followed by other airlines 
(Business Week, July 6, 1992). The general idea of a frequent 
flyer program is to give travellers free tickets after they 
have flown a certain number of miles on the seime airline. The 
number of miles varies from airline to airline but the basic 
idea remains to encourage previous customers to select the 
same airline for a future flight.
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Fifth, airlines use price as a means of competition because it 
is a very viable instrument for short-term, operational 
competition. In contrast to other ways of gaining a 
competitive advantage, such as having a good image, using 
modern equipment, etc., a price advantage can be achieved in 
a matter of days, namely the time it takes to let potential 
customers know what the fares are.
Besides price as the major means of competition, the second 
sphere of competition is that of quality of service. As its 
major elements, service quality includes frequency of service 
and number of destinations served, while flight amenities and 
'frills' only play a minor role. This is because travellers 
usually shop for a definite destination, at a preferred date 
and time, and through a travel agent who usually has access to 
all airlines. In cases where prices are about equal, the 
traveller is most likely to choose that airline which can 
match his or her itineraries best. Thus, service is giving 
airlines the competitive advantage needed to attract 
customers.
Barriers to Competition
All barriers to competition have in common the characteristic 
of limiting the influence of competitive forces in the market.
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Usually, this means that the market will perform on a sub- 
optimal level, with additional costs going to consumers 
compared to an ideally competitive market. In the air travel 
market, too, barriers of competition exist. Some of these 
barriers have been set up and developed on purpose by 
individual airlines in order to limit competition to their 
individual advantage.
One of the inherent competitive barriers is the development of 
hub-and-spoke systems. While it does not appear that such 
systems were set up to limit competition on purpose, hub-and- 
spoke systems clearly do so in city-pairs which either 
originate or terminate at a hub-airport. Evidence is given by 
a study conducted by the General Accounting Office in June 
1989. The study found that air fares were 27% higher at 15 
concentrated airports than at 38 less concentrated airports 
(Travel Weekly, August 2, 1990). Since most of these airports 
are used by either one or two airlines as a hub, and their 
percentile amount of total departures is on a virtually 
monopolistic level, it follows that concentration as a barrier 
to competition is the primary reason for the empirically 
proven higher prices. For example, in 1986, Delta and 
American together held 87% of traffic in Dallas, while Salt 
Lake City was dominated 75% by Delta alone (Dempsey, 1989).
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Another barrier to competition, which was set up by airlines 
deliberately to limit competition, is frequent flyer programs. 
By promising free flights after a certain amount of travelled 
milage, they focus consumers on one airline, thus making 
travellers more insensitive to competitive actions by rival 
airlines, and limiting competition.
Competition in the air travel market is also hindered by 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS's), several of which are in 
use. Mostly, they were developed by large airlines, with 
several smaller airlines following as part of the network. 
SABRE, introduced by American Airlines as the first CRS in 
1976, is the oldest and most widely used. CRS's are used by 
travel agencies to get necessary information about flights, as 
well as for booking. They pose a barrier to competition since 
they promote flights of the parent airline, while keeping 
flight options of competing airlines in the background.
A barrier to competition, which partially results from the 
existence of frequent flyer programs and CRS's, is barrier to 
entry. This is in contrast to the opinions of Crandall and 
Kahn, who argue that barriers of entry are low and that few 
economies of scale exist. But, realities in today's market 
show a totally different picture. First, 68% of airports 
offer no gates for new entrants (Dempsey, 1989). Four 
airports (Chicago-0'Hare, New York-JFK,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
New York-LaGuardia, and Washington-National) are even operated 
on a slot system, requiring new entrants to buy landing rights 
from airlines who hold these slots. Second, as already 
mentioned, CRS's and frequent flyer programs represent an 
enormous disadvantage to newcomers in gaining equal 
opportunity in attracting customers. Third, economies of 
scale do exist. Airline economics presented in Chapter III 
show that small airlines cannot get on the same low-cost level 
as large airlines. Additionally, they are not in the position 
of offering the same quality of service concerning flight 
frequency and schedule convenience.
A final issue concerning the limitation of competition by 
barriers is closely related to the responsibility the 
government has in instituting a competitive environment. It 
is the bankruptcy legislation, known by the public as the 
famous 'Chapter 11' . It helps bankrupt carriers by protecting 
them from creditors with deferment provisions for outstanding 
debt, thus allowing them to continue operations, while 
restructuring and trying to evolve from bankruptcy.
This practice has been very controversial lately. Some, such 
as American's Chairman an President Robert L. Crandall, argue 
that the bankruptcy laws have worked badly in every industry, 
and "... by prolonging the life of failed carriers, have had a 
terribly adverse impact on both the creditors and competitors
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
of bankrupt airlines and the financial health of the airlines 
industry" (Crandall, 1992). This argument is supported by 
market observations, which show that it is mostly the bankrupt 
carriers that underprice other airlines, thus causing price- 
wars leading to revenues covering only short-term costs, and 
non-profitability in the long-run. However, this support of 
bankrupt carriers can also be interpreted as having a positive 
impact on the competitive environment. Since the level of 
competition increases with the number of carriers, support for 
airlines that otherwise would have exited the market would be 
a welcome move for the competitive environment.
Emergence of Market Power
Market power in the airline industry is the direct result of 
the market becoming more concentrated. With many airlines 
going bankrupt, or being taken over by a major airline, there 
are fewer competitors remaining in the market which, as time 
goes by, then become an oligopoly. The situation of decreased 
competition has put large airlines that hold the biggest 
competitive advantage in the position of exercising power, 
especially over pricing. This is shown at hub airports where 
the degree of concentration is clearly correlated to the price 
level. Since the dominant carrier or carriers were able to 
set the high price level, it can be assumed that they had
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market power to some extent. Otherwise higher competition 
would have caused a lower price level.
The question of whether concentration in the airline industry, 
which is clearly happening, will lead to some airlines having 
high market power is widely discussed, and opinions differ 
widely. Crandall argues that "... as the number of carriers 
decreases, the remaining carriers add additional points to 
their networks and compete ever more ferociously in an ever- 
higher number of markets," thus indicating that market power 
cannot be achieved by individual airlines since competition 
would in fact increase, and not decrease (Crandall, 1992). 
However, it is also possible that the remaining, larger 
airlines would choose to search for individual market niches, 
rather than meeting competition head-on.
Proponents of the theory that competition will decrease with 
a more concentrated market remind us that the unique character 
of transportation has to be taken into account. Brenner 
mentions that in other industries, even in cases of oligopoly, 
local markets do not end up with a one-supplier monopoly. But, 
he sees that possibility in air transportation (Brenner, 
1988). Dempsey reminds us that air transportation is not 
directly comparable to other industries, such as the soft 
drink industry, where Coca-Cola and Pepsi hold an oligopoly, 
while still having price competition (Dempsey, 1989).
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B a s e s  f o r  A i r l i n e  P r i c i n g
Generally, and in no contrast to other industries, airlines 
have several different options of how to formulate pricing. 
The first, and most obvious option, is, to make prices 
dependant on costs which have to be incurred in order to 
provide the service. Following that strategy when setting the 
price for a particular route, airlines would have to determine 
their costs of providing that service, and subsequently add a 
profit, thus arriving at the price which would be needed to be 
charged. Actually, cost-based pricing is the most healthy for 
both, producers and customers since it provides the producer 
with a decent profit, and the customer with a fairly priced 
product or service. It also contributes to high supply 
reliability since destructive forces in such markets are rare, 
and inherent balance contributes to advantageous stability.
Second, airlines can formulate prices relative to the degree 
of competition. Here, the objective of selling comes in the 
foreground which is tried to be achieved by offering a lower 
price than competitors. The objective of covering costs, as 
in case of cost-based pricing, still retains some importance 
but moves in the background. Especially in case of the 
airline industry, competition-based pricing is of inherent 
significance since the produced service of passenger air 
transportation is forever lost once airplanes take off. There
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is nothing like stocking. Consequently, airlines are eager to 
fill seats as much as possible, and this is only possible by 
winning the competition against other airlines.
One very nasty form of competition-based pricing is predatory 
pricing. Airlines engaging in predatory pricing have the 
objective of ruining other airlines in the market. They 
mostly have considerable market power which they use to keep 
prices under profitability levels. The large, financially 
powerful airlines are able to survive such periods of losses, 
while the targeted, smaller airlines are not. Then, after 
competition has vanished, prices can be raised again, and 
losses from predatory pricing more than compensated in a 
market of lower competition. Today, there is much discussion 
if the 'Big Three', American, United, and Delta are involved 
in predatory pricing. For example, American's move in the 
Spring of 1992 to slash prices by 50% for summer travel, 
supports the argument that predatory pricing might have been 
involved since no profitability is possible on this price 
level.
Third, pricing can be made dependant on the price sensitivity 
of customers. In that case, airlines charge as much as 
customers are ready to pay. Since different groups of airline 
customers, such as leisure and business travellers, have 
different price sensitivities, a need for discrimination
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arises. Consequently, airlines charge travellers different 
prices for the same service.
Competitive Pricing and Price Discrimination
When analyzing the current situation in the air travel market 
concerning pricing, it is impossible to find solely one 
pricing-base used to formulate prices. In fact, all three of 
them are used. The combination of cost-based, competition- 
based, and sensitivity-based pricing is used throughout the 
country, with some alternations in a couple of city sub- 
markets where, for example, competition is more intense, and 
thus competitive pricing needs to be more in the foreground 
than other pricing-bases. The composition of this currently 
quite complex pricing strategy will be analyzed in the 
following.
Foremost, competition-based pricing is of great dominance. 
This is both, logically understandable, and empirically shown 
in the market. For example, the highly competitive market out 
of Phoenix, due to the presence of no-frills carrier Southwest 
Airlines, shows significantly lower fares for routes of 
comparable distances than Cincinnati where competition is 
relatively low as a result of Delta's dominance. Logically, 
everything that has been said concerning airline economics and
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the competitive environment of the air travel market supports 
an approach of emphasizing the filling of empty seats. And, 
since the current air travel market has an oversupply, this 
only can be accomplished by winning customers in a competition 
against other carriers.
The second pricing-base which is of an equal importance in the 
current air travel market as competition-based pricing, is 
sensitivity-based pricing. Its manifestation is in the 
discriminatory aspect of current airline pricing. This arises 
since the philosophy of sensitivity-based pricing is to aspire 
to have every passenger pay as much as possible which, 
economically seen, means to minimize the consumer's surplus, 
which is the difference between the consumer's readiness to 
pay under the most unfavorable circumstances and the current 
market circumstances.
The most obvious price discrimination in today's airline 
market is between leisure and business travellers since 
business travellers accept relatively high fares, while 
leisure travellers do not. For example, the price-tag of 
$1000 for a coast-to-coast flight would not attract very many 
leisure travellers, while only few business travellers regard 
that price as prohibitive. Consequently, airlines have 
created many 'filters’ to separate business from leisure 
travellers in order to be able to charge them different.
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customized fares. The most widely used are 7-day, or 14-day 
advance booking requirements, as well a required Saturday 
overnight stay at the destination. These 'filters' separate 
most of the business travellers from leisure travellers since 
only few business travellers are in the position to fulfil 
these requirements. The strategy of the airlines then is to 
charge travellers fulfilling these requirements low fares, 
while offering travellers not fulfilling the requirements only 
high fares.
The airline's business strategy of discrimination based on a 
time-frame requiring advance booking of 7 or 14 days demands 
a quite sophisticated inventory management of future flights. 
Since high prices for airline seats will be achieved shortly 
before the actual flight by selling to those who were not able 
to plan well in advance, airlines need to retain capacity for 
these travellers. Today, this is done by computerized systems 
supporting inventory and yield management. These systems 
assist in dealing with the dilemma of leaving too much 
capacity for short-notice travellers against leaving too 
little space, and thus losing the high price customers.
Finally, besides competition-based and sensitivity-based 
pricing, there is still cost-based pricing playing a role in 
the complex airline pricing formulation. However, its part in 
airline pricing is only out of inherent reasons. For example.
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cost-based influence dictates the frame in which competition- 
based and sensitivity-based pricing can be utilized. It is 
not $10 - $100 a coast-to-coast flight can cost, but more 
something like $200 - $2000, and these boundaries are set but 
costs. Airlines did not choose to have these boundaries. 
They were given by the inherent relationship between cost and 
price.
The situation in the current air travel market is very much a 
reflection of the earlier mentioned competition-based and 
sensitivity-based pricing. The strive to win competition 
against other airlines, and the strategy to have the traveller 
pay as much as possible, have led a plethora of uncountable 
fares. The Airline Tariff Publishing Company (ATP) estimated 
in 1991 that airlines during that year alone will have entered 
78.5 million new fares (Travel Weekly, August 29, 1991, p.20).
Cross-Subsidization
Cross-subsidization is a pricing strategy already known from 
the time of regulation. While airlines enjoyed high profit 
margins on major routes (e.g. Los Angeles-New York) due to 
great demand and high ticket prices set by the CAB, they were 
supposed to use some of these profits to subsidize their 
service to small communities where they were losing money.
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Demand for air travel on these routes was low, but it was 
regarded to be in the national interest to provide small 
communities with air transportation, and at a reasonable 
price.
After 1978, the situation virtually reversed: it is now the
profits from service to selected minor markets, such as 
Madison, Wisconsin or Dubuque, Iowa, which offset losses in 
major markets. The reason for this situation lies in the 
changes of the regulatory and competitive environments since 
regulation. With the freedom to choose which cities to serve, 
airlines were able to select only these where profitable 
service was achievable. Additionally, low competition in 
minor markets enabled airlines to charge highly profitable 
ticket prices. For example, in 1987 the trip from Madison, 
Wisconsin to St.Louis, Missouri cost $225 one way, while a 
ticket from New York to Los Angeles via St. Louis was only $199 
(Dempsey, 1989).
However, cross-subsidization actually does not always take 
place from minor markets to major markets, but rather from 
markets of low competition to markets of high competition. It 
is just a coincidence that minor markets are usually less 
competitive due to their small demand.
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Hub-Pricing
As already mentioned, airports serving as an airline's hub 
tend to have a higher price level than non-hub airports. In 
chapter V, discussing the competitive environment of the 
airline business, this was traced to the limitation of 
competition as a result of high concentration and dominance by 
one or more airlines- These previous findings fit the 
analysis of this chapter, identifying competition-based 
pricing as one of the dominant bases of the complex airline 
pricing process.
The General Accounting Office found in 1988 that air fares 
were 27% higher at 15 airports where one or two airlines 
dominated than at 38 less concentrated airports (Travel 
Weekly, June 15, 1989, p.51). This fact was not denied by the 
Air Transport Association at all. With a report authored by 
a prestigious consulting firm they defended their pricing 
policies by arguing that the biggest single factor that leads 
to high fares is a high quality of service (Travel Weekly, 
June 15, 1989, p.51). This, however, also shows that the
higher price level is not based on higher costs since no 
additional costs have to be incurred in order to provide the 
higher quality of service at a hub-airport.
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Since a cost-based higher price level at hub-airports is out 
of question, it has to be assumed that competition-based 
pricing is utilized. It would be irrational if airlines would 
not adjust their pricing relative to the degree of competition 
at hub-airports, while they do at other, non-hub airports.
New Pricing Approaches
As a result of pricing strategies currently employed by 
airlines in the U.S. market, consumers have to deal with a 
very complex fare structure. When facing the need to travel, 
consumers often find themselves in a situation where they feel 
they do not have the buying situation under control. It is 
the classic experience of sitting next to somebody on the same 
airplane, and in the same class who paid only a fraction of 
the price paid by oneself that shies away people from flying. 
As a result, people sometimes prefer using other forms of 
travel or do not travel at all.
The consumer frustration with the complex fare structure that 
was perceived as both irrational and unfair (Crandall, 1992) 
has not been unnoticed by airline executives. In their 
struggle against each other, as well in their attempt to 
attract more passengers, they developed, and still are 
developing new pricing approaches. American Airlines, a
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proven leader in the industry who previously pioneered 
frequent flyer programs and computer reservation systems 
(CRS's), introduced its 'Value Pricing' on April 9, 1992.
This new pricing approach embodies only four different fares 
for the same flight and class of cabin, a significant 
reduction of the plethora of fares prior to 'Value Pricing', 
and aims at travellers who previously stayed away from air 
travel because of the perceived unfairness of fares.
Another attempt to change pricing in 1990 already failed 
during planning, when American Airlines and TWA tried to make 
prices dependent on the actual milage flown. Although the new 
fares would have meant only a small deviation from previous 
fares, the price increase for long-haul routes due to the high 
milage meant that the new plan was not doable. Major 
competitors such as Delta and United refused to go along. 
Consequently, American and TWA could not afford to raise 
prices for certain routes while the competition stayed on 
their existing price level, and gave up their plans.
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Summary
It has been the intention of this paper to make the subject of 
price formulation by airlines more understandable by 
presenting and analyzing the driving forces behind it. An 
evolutionary development is taking place in the airline 
industry. Presently, the airline market is going through a 
deregulatory process which started in 1978, and, as Robert 
Crandall puts it (1992), "is still working its way through the 
industry". It is the painful process of transition from an 
inefficient industry, secured by government protection to an 
industry where every airline has to prove itself in the 
marketplace.
Beside this evolutionary development, the second major factor 
for airlines concerning pricing is the special economics they 
face. Variable costs of providing air travel service are 
relatively low, while in comparison fixed costs represent a 
very high percentage of total costs. A result of this special 
cost structure for pricing is that selling at long-term 
unprofitable price-levels still makes sense in the short-term. 
This is because realized prices in the market are 
significantly higher than variable costs, and airlines achieve 
a unit contribution and cover fixed costs.
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As a result, when faced by fierce price competition in the 
market at prices below profitability level, airlines still 
choose to match market prices in order to attract travellers 
since small losses are stiller better than high losses. At 
times, depending on the situation in the air travel market, 
airlines go through long periods of sub-profitable price 
levels during which one of the main pricing policy objectives 
becomes 'damage control', and the orientation of pricing 
shifts from long-term to short-term.
The third factor of influence on airline pricing is the 
competitive characteristic of the air travel market which 
Crandall describes as "...intensely, vigorously, bitterly, 
savagely competitive" (Business Week, July 6, 1992). This is 
because it is in the market where airlines have to prevail 
against other airlines, and the price shows to be a primary 
means of getting a competitive advantage.
It has been found that airlines, faced by the major factors of 
influence mentioned, currently are employing three bases in 
formulating their pricing strategies. These are competition- 
based, cost-based, and sensitivity-based pricing, the last 
being an approach of taking advantage of different levels of 
price elasticity among airline passengers. None of these 
bases of pricing is used separately from the others. They
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always are utilized in combination, with the weight 
distribution among them shifting.
Conclusions and Implications
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the findings 
of this paper. First, airlines have to accept disadvantageous, 
and, in most cases, abruptly changing price levels in the 
market as given and largely out of their individual control. 
Their focus has to be to achieve the best possible result out 
of a given situation, even if it is a loss. Currently, with 
many airlines struggling in bankruptcy, price levels are low 
and unprofitable. However, once oversupply is eliminated from 
the market, the remaining airlines can expect a stabilization 
of the air travel market. Consequently, airlines have to aim 
at coming out with the least damage from the current ' bad 
times' in order to be as fit as possible in future. A 
plausible approach, for example, might involve strict cost 
control, in the absence of influence over prices.
Second, and as a result of airline economics, pricing needs to 
be done primarily from a competitive point of view. Different 
pricing approaches, such as cost-based pricing, are desirable 
and potentially beneficial for the airline industry as a 
whole. However, individual airlines can only engage in 
different than competition-based pricing if every competing
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airline follows suit, and thus no airline gains a competitive 
price advantage over another.
Third, airline pricing has to be made more simple as a 
reaction to customer frustration with a fare structure which 
is perceived as unfair and irrational. Airlines have to stop 
employing certain sensitivity-based pricing where 
disadvantages due to negative customer reaction outweigh 
achieved advantages. However, finding a good balance might 
prove to be rather difficult, and remains a major challenge 
for airlines.
Fourth, there is a need for responsibility for the health of 
the air travel industry as a whole by each individual airline. 
Since competitive considerations are of primary importance in 
the pricing formulation process, airlines have to develop an 
understanding that short-term advantages achieved by price- 
cutting almost instantly are matched and the new, lower price 
level will hurt the airline itself, as well as all other 
airlines in the market. With the development of a concern for 
the industry as a whole, individual airlines have to step away 
from short-term price-cutting, which leads to destructive 
competition and disadvantages for every airline in the market.
All three major factors of influence on airline pricing 
namely, history, airline economics, and competitive
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considerations, have in common their close relationship to the 
market. This is not surprising since it was the objective of 
deregulation in 1978 to expose air transportation to the 
powers of the market, and thus provide the public with quality 
air transportation at significantly lower prices due to 
increased efficiency. Several implications are evident for 
regulatory and public policy bodies.
First, legislation has to allow the market forces to establish 
a balance between supply and demand, and to eliminate carriers 
which are not able to survive. The current situation in the 
market shows that struggling carriers do not enhance 
competition, but distract from the desired effect of 
competitive forces in the market, and jeopardize the financial 
health of the airline industry. Consequently, bankruptcy laws 
protecting bankrupt carriers should be reexamined since they 
prolong the presence of inefficient carriers in the market.
Second, the slot-system which limits equal access to the 
nation’s most highly congested airports should be replaced. 
Instead a congestion-based takeoff and landing fees system 
should be brought into effect, as advocated by 
Morrison/Winston (1990) and Crandall (1992). The result would 
be an enhancement of competition since all carriers would have 
potential access for the price of a fee which would bring the 
same result as the slot-system.
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Third, frequent flyer programs should be closely examined in 
their impact on competition, and, in case they are found to be 
limiting competition, they should be taxed. The additional 
costs for airlines for running a frequent flyer program would 
make airlines more reluctant to abuse frequent flyer programs 
as an instrument for diverting competition to their own 
advantage. The result would be increased competition which 
benefits both consumers and airlines.
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